The	good,	the	bad,	and	the	naive Michael	Schmitz (Please cite the version published in: Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler	(eds.),	The	Philosophy	of	Perception.	Proceedings	of	the	Austrian	Ludwig Wittgenstein	Society, 57-74,	Berlin:	DeGruyter) Die	Übereinstimmung,	Harmonie,	von	Gedanke	und	Wirklichkeit	liegt	darin,	dass,	wenn	ich fälschlich	sage,	etwas	sei	rot,	es	doch	immerhin	nicht	rot	ist.	Und	wenn	ich	jemandem	das	Wort "rot"	im	Satze	"Das	ist	nicht	rot"	erklären	will,	ich	dazu	auf	etwas	Rotes	zeige. Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Philosophische	Untersuchungen,	§	429 Ein	Wort	ohne	Rechtfertigung	gebrauchen,	heisst	nicht,	es	zu	Unrecht	gebrauchen. Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Philosophische	Untersuchungen,	§	2891 Abstract A	perceptual	realism	that	is	naive	in	a	good	way	must	be	naively	realistic	about	world	and mind.	But	contemporary	self-described	naive	realists	often	have	trouble	acknowledging that both the good cases of successful perception and the bad cases of illusion and hallucination	involve	internal	experiential	states	with	intentional	contents	that	present the world as being a certain way. They prefer to think about experience solely in relational terms because they	worry that	otherwise	we	won't be able to escape from radical	skepticism.	I	argue	that	experiential	relations	to	objects	require	that	their	subjects be in internal experiential states. But this does not mean that these states are our epistemological	starting	point	which	can	be	known	independently	of	any	knowledge	of the	external	world.	We	do	escape	the	epistemological	predicament	of	radical	skepticism because	the	good	cases	are	primary	over	the	bad	ones.	But	this	is	not	because	the	good cases	alone	provide	reasons	for	belief,	but	because	we	do	not	need	a	reason	to	think	we are	in	a	good	case,	but	do	need	a	reason	to	think	we	are	not,	and	such	a	reason	must	come from	a	good	case.	So	bad	cases	can	only	be	thought	of	as	deviations	from	good	cases.	And we	can	only	understand	experiences	as	states	with	contents	distinct	from	their	objects and	present	in	good	and	bad	cases	once	we	understand	misrepresentation,	that	is,	bad cases,	and	therefore	only	as	we	ascribe	knowledge	of	the	external	world	to	ourselves. Keywords:	perception,	naïve	realism,	intentionalism,	externalism,	skepticism 1 Elizabeth Anscombe translated these as follows: "The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then, for all that, it isn't red. And when I want to explain the word "red" to someone, in the sentence "That is not red", I do it by pointing to something red." and "To use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right." (Wittgenstein 1958). 1. Introduction We	directly	perceptually	experience	objects	–	things,	properties,	states	of	affairs.	That	is, for	example,	I	see	a	table,	I	see	its	white	color,	and	I	see	that	it	is	white.	That	I	perceive these	objects	directly	means	that	I	do	not	first	experience	something	else	–	ideas,	sense data, or the like –	directly and then the table only indirectly. But which objects I experience depends not only on the state of the world external to me, but on my subjective,	internal,	experiential	state.	It	depends	on	how	the	world	seems	to	me	to	be. That	is,	it	depends	on	the	content	of	my	experience	–	how	it	presents	the	world	as	being –	and	on	whether	that	content	matches	how	the	world	really	is.	Usually	it	does.	Illusion or hallucination are much rarer than one might suspect from the outsize attention philosophers	have	given	to	them,	but	when	such	misexperiences	do	occur,	they	are	cases of	contents	without	corresponding	objects. This	is	a	naively	realistic	view	of	perception	which	seems	like	mere	common	sense	to me, except perhaps that I used the slightly technical notion of content. Its distinctive feature	on	the	contemporary	theoretical	scene	is	that	it	is	naively	realistic	about	world and mind. This is worth noting because the label 'naive realism' has recently been appropriated	by	views	which	seem	less	than	naively	realistic	about	the	mind.	Such	views emphasize experiential relations between subject and world, but are shy about acknowledging that such relations can only obtain in virtue of a subject's inner experiential	and	intentionally	contentful	states.	But	why	would	anybody	feel	a	tension between embracing experiential relations and experiential subjective states if –	approaching	things	naively	–	it	seems	obvious	that	the	former	could	not	exist	without the	latter?	I	believe	that	in	order	to	understand	this	and	make	progress	on	the	issue	of perceptual	realism	we	need	to	engage	in	a	Wittgensteinian	diagnosis	and	therapy	of	the underlying	concerns. In	this	spirit,	I	will	provide	a	very	brief	and	schematic	history	and	diagnosis	of	some of these concerns in the next section. In the third section, I will more precisely characterize the views I am criticizing as forms of "austere relationism". The fourth section	will	provide	a	blueprint	of	the	positive	view	to	be	defended,	the	fifth	will	address some	concerns	about	the	central	notion	of	content,	and	the	sixth	the	deep	epistemological worries	underlying	the	reluctance	to	acknowledge	experience	as	an	inner	state,	before	I outline	the	positive	alternative	in	the	final	seventh	section. 2. Subjectivism	vs.	objectivism At least since Rene Descartes, philosophy has been torn between subjectivism and objectivism.	Descartes	made	mind	the	starting	point	of	philosophy	and	created	a	chasm between	mind	and	world.	While	Descartes	himself	believed	that	this	chasm	could	still	be bridged	in	a	realistic	fashion,	idealism	and	other	forms	of	subjectivism	despaired	of	this task	and	instead	tried	to	overcome	this	chasm	by	making	world	dependent	on	mind	or constructing world out of mind. For subjectivism mind is metaphysically and epistemologically primary. For example, phenomenalists tried to construct ordinary objects	out	of	sense	data.	Epistemologically,	for	the	subjectivist	ideas,	sensa,	sense	data etc. become the immediate objects of experience and thus block direct access to the world.	This	also	brings	with it	a	view	of	our	awareness	of	our	own	mental	states that seems badly naive: the awareness of ideas is immediate and independent of any knowledge	of	the	world.	Experience	is	the	epistemological	starting	point	that	supposedly can	be	made	sense	of	independently	of	whether	we	actually	succeed	in	representing	the world.	Consequently,	this	success	becomes	very	problematic. Subjectivism dominated philosophy for a long time, but in the 20th century philosophers	increasingly	felt	this	was	intolerable.	There	was	a	strong	reaction	against subjectivism and objectivist viewpoints became more and more influential. For objectivism	world	is	metaphysically	and	epistemologically	primary.	Mind	is	dependent on	world	or	can	be	constructed	out	of	world.	For	example,	behaviorists	construed	mental states	out	of	behavior.	Moving	closer	to	our	present	concerns,	content	externalists	hold that	mental	content	may	be	determined	through	features	of	the	world	–	e.g.	whether	the stuff	from	lakes	and	rivers	that	they	drink	is	H2O	or	XYZ	(Putnam	1975)	–	that	subjects are	unaware	of	–	at	least	in	any	ordinary	sense.	On	the	content	externalist	view,	world	is partly	constitutive	of	what	subjects	mean	and	think	in	the	sense	that	features	unknown	to them can determine it. This externalism was then sometimes invoked to respond to epistemological	concerns.	Even	if	we	are	brains	in	a	vat	–	in	the	scenario	that	updated Descartes'	demon	thought	experiment	–	might	not	most	of	our	beliefs	still	be	true	because our	words	and	thoughts	refer	to	the	regular	causes	of	our	experiences	(Putnam	1981)? The	price	for	accepting	this	response	to	skepticism	is	that	intuitively	these	causes	–	the electrical	stimuli	controlled	by	the	evil	neuroscientists	–	are	rather	different	from	what they	appear	to	be. Externalism is still orthodox in contemporary philosophy. But one of its most perceptive critics, Donald Davidson, already gave a compelling diagnosis of its shortcomings very early: it provides no	more than a "transposed image of Cartesian skepticism"	(Davidson	2001:	22).	Davidson's	point	was	that	now	the	subject	loses	its	grip on its own	mental states. But not even our conception of the relation between these mental	states	and	the	world	has	really	improved.	The	subject	is	still	just	as	out	of	touch with	the	world	as	on	the	subjectivist	picture.	The	illusion	that	something	has	improved substantially	arises	only	because	objectivism	invites	us to take	an	external,	3rd	person point	of	view	on	the	situation.	By	adopting	this	point	of	view	we	can	see	what	the	person really	refers	to	or	what	their	beliefs	are	really	about	(compare	Searle	1983:	230).	But	this external	determination	is	revealed	as	cold	comfort	when	we	take	up	the	point	of	view	of the	subject.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	subject,	the	relevant	features	remain	unknown. The	abyss	between	mind	and	world	persists:	only	apparent	progress	has	been	made	by declaring	ostensibly	unknown	features	of	the	world	to	be	constitutive	of	mind. 3. What	is	"austere	relationism"? Against	this	historical	background	let	me	now	characterize	more	closely	what	I	think	is a bad	kind	of	naive	realism,	the	kind	of	view	that	Susanna	Schellenberg	(2011)	has	aptly called "austere relationism". According to austere relationism, the good cases (of successful	perception)	and the	bad	cases (of illusion	and	hallucination)	are	not	of the same	kind,	or	at least	not	of the	same fundamental	kind.	Nor	do	the	good	and	the	bad cases	share	the	property	of	having	intentional	content.	Austere	relationism	is	a	form	of disjunctivism.	Introspectively,	I	can	only	say	that	my	current	state	is	either	a	perceptual experience	(relationally	conceived),	or	an	illusion	or	hallucination.	I	cannot	say	that	there is	a	common	factor	here,	namely	that	they	all	involve	(non-relational)	experiences	with intentional	content	that	presents	the	world	as	being	a	certain	way.	This	is	what	makes this	relationism	austere. Austere	relationists	certainly	deny	that	perceptual	experience	is	representational	and has	intentional	content,	but	is	their	relationism	so	austere	that	it	rejects	experience	as	an internal subjective state in any sense at all? I	don't	want to	make such an accusation lightly	and	I	am	not	sure	about	all	philosophers	who	have	held	views	in	this	ballpark	of ideas,	but	certain	things	that its	proponents	have	said	(and	have	not	said)	are	hard	to make	sense	of	otherwise.	For	example,	one	frequently	finds	in	this	literature	claims	like that features	of the	external	world	constitute	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience (e.g. Campbell 2002: 116). For example, the redness of the table constitutes the phenomenal character of an experience of redness. Since the notion of phenomenal character	was	explicitly introduced	to	capture	the	what it is like	of	a	state, that	which makes	it	the	state	of	consciousness	that	it	is,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	this	move	could	not	be intended to replace any notion of inherent subjective properties of perceptual consciousness.	Nor is it intelligible	how	an internal state	of such	consciousness could even	exist	while	lacking	any	inherent	phenomenal	properties. A	further	piece	of	evidence:	when	austere	relationists	do	acknowledge	the	obvious fact	that	there	must	be	internal	enabling	conditions	for	experiential	relations	to	objects –	that	whether	such	relations	obtain	cannot	only	depend	on	the	state	of	the	world	around the organism, but must also depend on the state of the organism itself –	they only characterize	these	conditions	in	physiological	terms	(Fish	2009),	or	in	terms	of	"cognitive processing"	(Campbell	2002:	118),	but	not	in	experiential	terms.	But	again:	if	we	want	to make sense of the experiential perceptual relation, we need an internal, subjective experiential	state.	When	I	experience	the	table,	when	I	am	perceptually	conscious	of	it,	it is	only	me	that	has	an	experience	or	is	in	a	state	of	experience	or	consciousness.	The	table does	not	experience	anything	and	is	not	part	of	my	experiential	state,	but	just	its	object. Only my subjective experiential state can turn my relation to it into an experiential relation. Therefore, neither subjectivism	nor	objectivism can	make sense of the perceptual relation.	Subjectivism	internalizes	it	as	a	relation	between	subjects	and	subjective	items such	as	ideas	or	sense	data.	It	therefore	fails	to	make	epistemological	sense	of	perceptual relatedness	to	external	objects,	and	it	is	easy	to	see	why	this	must	be	so:	if	we	can	make sense	of	experience	independently	of	any	awareness	of	the	external	world,	how	could	it ground	such	awareness?	The	only	escape	then	is	to	try	to	construct	world	out	of	mind. Conversely,	as	we	have	seen,	austere	relationism	cannot	make	sense	of	the	experiential perceptual relation because it finds itself unable to acknowledge internal subjective experiential	states,	which	alone	can	turn	this	relation	into	an	experiential	relation.	The only	escape	then	is	to	try	to	construct	mind	out	of	world,	e.g.	to	claim	that	external	objects constitute	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience. I believe that a central motivation for this and other kinds of externalism is epistemological	even	when	these	views	are	not	expressly	presented	as	epistemological. Putnam justified his version of content externalism mostly by appeal to semantic intuitions.	But	a	broader	motivation	was	surely	to	escape	subjectivism	and	to	bring	the world	(and	our	fellow	creatures)	into	our	theories	of	meaning	and	thought.	And	as	we saw, Putnam soon tried to make epistemological hay out of content externalism. Similarly, a core motivation for austere relationism is certainly the idea that only experience as construed relationally could adequately ground our knowledge of the world	and	defeat	skepticism.	And	properly	understood,	these	motivations	are	quite	valid. As	I	argued,	the	problem	is	just	that	the	externalist	proposals	reproduce	the	precarious, broadly	Cartesian,	character	of	the	relation	between	mind	and	world	and	merely	invert its description. In either case, the mind appears unable to distinguish e.g. between whether	this	is	H2O	or	XYZ	in	its	environment;	whether	it	is	experiencing	a	red	table	or merely the electrical stimulations generated by the evil neuroscientist; whether it is experiencing anything real at all, or just undergoing an illusion or hallucination. The subjectivist responds	by	making	world	dependent	on	mind, the	objectivist	by	making mind	dependent	on	world. 4. How	to	be	a	naive	realist	about	mind	and	world The	blueprint	for	a	better	response,	for	a	view	that	genuinely	overcomes	the	Cartesian predicament	rather	than	just	inverting	it,	can	be	taken	from	the	Wittgenstein	quote	that I	used	as	one	of	the	epigraphs	for	this	paper	(PI,	§	429).	Wittgenstein	talks	about	thought and negation, but his point equally applies to experience and	mere seeming.	We can rephrase	it	as	follows:	when	I	undergo	an	illusion	or	hallucination	of	redness,	the	redness that is not there, that	merely appears to be there, is still inextricably tied to the real redness	that	I	experience	in	successful	perception.	I	cannot	explain	–	not	even	to	myself –	what	it	is	that	I	appeared	to	be	perceiving	without	pointing	to	a	real	instance	of	redness. (In	some	cases,	the	connection	might	be	more	indirect,	but	the	basic	point	still	holds.)	In this	way,	mind	and	world	are	not	married	by	force,	as	it	were,	from	an	external	point	of view, by making mind dependent on a feature whose presence or absence it cannot detect,	but	by	arguing	that	misrepresentation	can	only	be	conceived	in	relation	to	and	as a	deviation	from	cases	of	successful	representation.	Far	from	opening	up	an	unbridgeable chasm between mind and world, misrepresentation presupposes successful representation. The	notion	of	content	is	also	tied	into	this	nexus.	Experiential	states	are	internal	states of	the	organism	and	their	content	is	an	inherent	feature	of	these	states.	But	content	can only	be	understood	in	relation	to	external	objects.	That	is	why	the	fact	that	something visually seems to be red (square) –	that there is a visual content presenting redness (squareness)	–	can	only	be	understood	in	relation	to	things	that	are	really	red	(square). The	subject	can	only	fully	distinguish	content	from	object	by	understanding	the	bad	cases of	misrepresentation,	by	distinguishing	appearance	from	reality,	by	being	able	to	think something	like:	it	seems	visually	to	me	to	be	red,	but	it	is	not	really	red.	And	again,	bad cases	can	only	be	understood	in	relation	to	good	ones. This	means	that there is	a	sense in	which	on	the	view	to	be	developed,	perceptual experiential	relations	are	prior	to	mere	experiential	states.	In	this	regard	the	view	is	a relational	account.	But	it's	not	an	austere	relationism	because	it	insists	that	both	the	good and	the	bad	cases	must	involve	experiential	subjective	states	with	intentional	content.	So like	several	recent	authors	(Dorsch	2010;	Schellenberg	2011;	McDowell	2013) I try to find a synthesis between intentionalism and relationism (and internalism and externalism).	Accordingly,	this	view	can	be	called	"relational	intentionalism". Let	me	state	its	main	tenets	as	explicitly	as	possible.	There	are	experiential	relations –	which	can	be	reported	by	sentences	such	as	"I	experienced	the	monitor	in	front	of	me". But	these	relations	obtain	partly	in	virtue	of	experiential	states	of	the	subject	–	states	that can	be	reported	by	sentences	such	as	"I	had	an	experience	as	of	a	monitor	in	front	of	me". We conceptually focus on experiential relations with factive reports, which entail representational success and on experiential states with neutral reports such as "It visually	seemed	to	me	that	there	was	a	monitor	in	front	of	me",	or	with	counterfactive reports	such	as	"I	hallucinated	a	monitor	in	front	of	me".	States	are	present	in	bad	and good	cases,	relations	only in	good	ones.	Experiential	states	are internal	and	subjective states of the organism that have intentional content that determines conditions of satisfaction. The	main	task	of	this	paper	will	be	to	explain	the	sense	in	which	experiential	relations and	good	cases	are	primary	relative	to	bad	cases	and	mere	experiences	/	states	and	thus to address the epistemological worries which are the main force driving austere relationism. But before I come to this, it will be useful to address some of the	main misunderstandings	and	concerns	with	regard	to	the	notion	of	content. 5. Some	concerns	about	content The	most	tempting	mistake	about	content	is	to	think	that	it	is	somehow	'between'	mind and	world,	such	that	a	subject	would	first	refer	to	content	and	then	only	indirectly	–	if	at all – to the	world. To think about content in this	way is to turn it into some kind of epistemic	intermediary	between	mind	and	world	like	a	sense	datum.	But	content	is	not between	mind	and	world	at	all.	Content	talk	just	refers	to	the	way	the	experience	is	with regard to its intentional significance. We are not aware of content at the level of experience	at	all	–	but	only	of	objects	and	of	ourselves.	Only	at	the	level	of	reflection	do we become aware of content as distinct from object. Content is subjective and	what makes	it	the	case	that	we	are	aware	of	certain	objects	but	not	others.	For	example,	right now	I	experience	the	computer	screen	in	front	of	me,	but	if	the	content	of	my	experience were	different,	I	would	be	aware	of	different	objects,	or	none	at	all,	even	if	all	the	external facts	were	the	same. Content	is	therefore	also	needed	to	make	sense	of	the	good	cases.	It	is	important	to emphasize	this,	since	we	tend	to	focus	on	the	bad	cases	when	thinking	about	content,	as then	the	absence	of	relevant	objects	makes	content	more	conspicuous.	But	content	is	also required	to	make	sense	of	the	bad	cases:	these	can	only	be	bad	relative	to	conditions	of satisfaction	set	by	content.	Experience	(as	a	state)	can	only	misrepresent	or	mispresent when it	presents the	world	as	being	a	certain	way.	That is just	what it	means	to	have content.	If	we	deny	content	in	this	sense,	we	make	a	mockery	of	the	bad	cases	which	are essentially cases	where things seem to be a certain	way	which they are not. For any hallucination or illusion, for any experience, there must always be an answer to the question:	how	did	things	seem	to	the	subject,	how	did	it	experience	them	as	being? For	the	same	reason,	experience	cannot	be	"object-dependent"	and	content	cannot	be "gappy"	in	the	way	that	has	sometimes	been	suggested	in	the	literature	(e.g.	Schellenberg, 2011).	The	idea	of	gappy	content	is	the	idea	that,	for	example,	there	is	a	gap	or	hole	in	the content	of	hallucination	corresponding	to	the	hallucinated	object.	But	the	notion	of	gappy content	has	things	back	to	front.	The	gap	or	hole	is	actually	in	the	world	and	can	only	exist relative	to	conditions	of	satisfaction	set	by	content.	Only	because	the	experience	requires the presence of an object in order to be veridical, does its absence turn it into a hallucination.	If	there	were	really	a	gap	in	content	there,	content	would	not	require	the presence	of	the	object	and	there	would	be	no	hallucination. The	idea	that	some	content	is	object-dependent	is	a	residue	of	externalist	objectivism. It	makes	mind	locally	dependent	on	world.	It	is	certainly	no	accident	that	it	does	so	where particular	things	are	concerned.	In	the	philosophical	imagination,	particulars	have	long stood	out	as	paradigms	of	reality.	There is	a	direct line from	Russell's	suggestion	that particulars	might	actually	be	constituents	of	propositions	to	the	theory	of	gappy	content. This	kind	of	mindset	is	also	reflected	in	the	importance	that	has	often	been	given	to	the distinction	between	illusion	and	hallucination	and	in	the	closely	related	idea	that	content must	be	completely	general	and	thus	cannot	account	for	reference	to	particulars.	Before I	discuss	this	idea,	let	me	define	a	minimal	notion	of	content. On	a	minimal	construal,	content	is	first	and	foremost	the	property	of	internal	states that	sets	conditions	of	satisfaction.	Nothing	can	be	the	object	of	such	an	intentional	state except	by	matching	its	content.	That	is,	an	entity	could	not	determine	itself,	so	to	speak, to	be	the	object	of	an intentional	state,	but	could	only	be	that	relative	to	content.	And conversely,	the	world	can	also	only	fail	to	satisfy	a	state	because	that	state	has	content. The	minimal	notion	is	meant	to	formulate	a	bare	realism	about	intentionality	and	content. But	intentionalism	is	often	rejected	because	a	stronger	notion	of	content	is	implicitly	or explicitly assumed. I will now discuss some of these additional commitments often associated with intentionalism, beginning with the notion that content must be completely	general	or	descriptive. This understanding of content still tends to be taken for granted. It is not only manifest in the	theory	of	gappy	contents,	but	also in the	common	presupposition	that content could not be irreducibly indexical –	for example, in Putnam's (1975) classic argument	for	externalism	(compare	Searle	1983:	ch.	8).	So	let	us	consider	a	twin	earth scenario	here.	Does	my	experience	present	my	computer	screen	and	myself	in	completely general	terms?	Does	it	say	something	like	"There	is	a	screen	there	with	certain	features and	it	is	in	front	of	somebody	with	certain	features",	so	that	this	descriptive	content	might apply just	as	much	to	my	twin	on	twin	earth	as it	does	to	me?	Now,	my	experience	of course	does	not	really	say	anything,	nor	does	it	really	present	anything	in	general	terms or concepts –	because its content is not conceptual at all – nor even in indexical, demonstrative	terms	–	because	it	is	not	in	any	way	linguistic.	Still	it	seems	clear	that	its content is more akin to demonstrative content. It is certainly no accident that demonstrative	expressions	have	generally	been	thought	to	more	immediately	latch	onto perception	than	other	expressions.	Therefore	I	believe	we	can	say	that	the	content	of	my experience	is	more	akin	to	something	like	"This	screen	in	front	of	me...".	It	does	not	pick out	anything	–	whatever	it	may	be	–	that	meets	a	certain	description,	but	this	particular screen	in	front	of	this	particular	creature.	More	could	be	said	about	this,	but	in	the	present context this should suffice to shift the burden of proof to those who assume that perceptual content	must	be	general	or	descriptive.	One	can	be	an intentionalist about perception	without	being	a	descriptivist. Historically, the	notion	of content	originated in the context	of thought	about thatclauses,	propositions,	concepts	and	other	linguistic	or	quasi-linguistic	items,	and	this	has often	led	to	content	being	identified	with	propositional	and	conceptual	content.	This	in turn is why some philosophers reject the application of the notion of content to perceptual experience (or, generally to 'basic	minds'), because they rightly feel that it cannot	be	understood	in	language-centric	terms	(e.g.	Hutto	&	Myin	2012).	But	I	think	the proper	response	is	just	to	reject	the	language-centric	notion	and	embrace	content	that	is non-propositional	and	non-conceptual.	I	find	it	hard	to	understand	what	intentionality without	content	might	even	be,	because,	again,	what	should	bring	a	state	in	intentional contact with certain objects –	but not others –	and how could there be a perceptual experience,	where	there is	no	answer	to	the	question	what	was	experienced,	how	the world	seemed	to	its	subject? Similar remarks also apply to the austere relationist attempt to replace all talk of content with talk of the phenomenal character of experience. Even setting aside the already	discussed	problem	that	this	character	is	supposed	to	be	constituted	by	external objects,	it	is	not	clear	how	this	attempt	could	succeed.	The	suggestion	can	hardly	be	that the	phenomenal	features	of	perceptual	experience	are	non-representational	in	the	sense in	which	e.g.	mood	experience	is	arguably	non-representational,	or	in	the	sense	which	on some conceptions sensations are non-representational. This would seem to be inconsistent	with the insistence that experience "brings our surroundings into view" (Travis, 2004, p. 64) and can justify beliefs about it, which is absolutely central to relationism.	But	then	in	which	sense	is	experience	supposed	to	be	non-representational –	where	the	representational	includes	the	presentational?	Perceptual	experience	has	all the	marks of being intentional or representational: it is about certain features of the world, its subject is	directed at these. It is hard to understand	what the relationist is driving	at	here,	unless	we	take	her	to	reject	any	notion	of	experience	as	an	internal	state, and	/	or	to	use	a	notion	of	content	that	is	linguistic	by	definition. Having addressed some confusions about content, we are now in a position to confront	the	epistemological	worries	driving	austere	relationism. 6. The	epistemological	worry	driving	austere	relationism I	believe the central	worry	driving	austere relationism	might	be	put	as follows. If	we accept the distinction between experiential relations and experiential states and the claim that the states are also present in the bad cases, don't we then have to accept experience	in	the	sense	of	seeming	neutral	between	the	good	and	the	bad	cases,	as	our epistemological starting point? And aren't we then back in the original, Cartesian subjectivist	epistemological	predicament:	things	seem	to	me	to	be	a	certain	way,	but	what reason	can	you	give	me	that	they	really	ever	are	as	they	seem?	We	can	call	this	the	"plus predicament": what do we have to add to (non-relational) experience to defeat skepticism?	From there, I think	one can see the	pull	of insisting	a) that experience is fundamentally	relational,	and	b)	that	it	provides	us	with	reasons,	so	that	we	are	justified in	beliefs	based	on	it	–	as	it	guarantees	we	are	in	the	good	case!	A)	here	encapsulates	the metaphysical	aspect	or	version	of	relationism	/	disjunctivism,	and	b)	its	epistemological aspect or version, the idea that being in the good case puts the subject in an epistemologically privileged position. This instantiates the pattern that we already identified	in	the	case	of	Putnam's	content	externalism.	Broadly	metaphysical	intuitions are invoked to support an externalist thesis which then is supposed to bring an epistemological payoff. Some	may try to get the supposed epistemological advantage even without the metaphysical commitment (e.g. McDowell 2013), showing that the former	is	really	the	driving	force. I now want to argue that this reasoning, while tempting, "cheerfully accepts the Cartesian	premise,	while	trying	to	deny	the	Cartesian	conclusion",	as	Saul	Kripke	(1980: 145) put it in commenting on materialist responses to the metaphysical mind-body problem. As John Searle (1992: ch. 1) has shown, the typical materialist accepts the Cartesian conceptual dualistic opposition between	mind and body and thus can only avoid	the	Cartesian	conclusion	of	ontological	dualism	by	construing	mind	out	of	world, that is, body. Analogously, the relationist accepts the Cartesian epistemological opposition between mind and world, according to which experience is our epistemological	starting	point,	from	which	we	can	raise	the	question	whether	we	have knowledge	of	the	external	world.	The	only	way	then	to	avoid	the	subjectivist	conclusion that we lack any such knowledge is to construe experience and / or the subject's epistemological position out of world, that is, purely relationally. But the Cartesian starting	point	is	optional. Before	I	outline	an	alternative,	let	us	think	about	how	relationism	is	supposed	to	show our epistemological situation in a better light, so that	we feel warranted in rejecting skepticism.	Of	course,	we	can	definitionally	tie	experience	to	the	good	case,	but	obviously that	does	not	improve	our	chances	of	being	in	the	good	case.	To	put	it	disjunctivist	style, we	are	still	faced	with	the	initial	disjunction	that	we	are	either	experiencing	something, or	undergoing	an	illusion	or	hallucination.	Nor	does	thinking	of	experience	as	providing reasons	help,	because	we	are	still	not	in	a	better	position	to	know	that	we	possess	this reason.	Now,	it	might	be	objected	that	I'm	missing	the	point.	"Look,"	somebody	might	say, "of	course	relationism	cannot	improve	our	chances	of	being	in	the	good	case.	The	point	is just	to	put	us	at	ease	that	it	is	rationally	ok	to	move	from	experience	to	belief	in	the	face of	skepticism.	And	only	a	conception	that	ties	experience	to	the	good	case	and	thinks	of	it as	providing	reasons	can	do	this."	That	the	point	is	to	declare	experiences	to	be	reasons so that	we feel rationally justified in	moving from	experience to	belief	highlights	how relationism	revolves	around	another	broadly	Cartesian	notion,	namely	that	our	response to	skepticism	should	take	the	form	of	providing	a	reason	in	support	of	our	belief	in	the external	world.	Philosophers	have suggested	many	such	reasons,	but	no	proposal	has seemed convincing. Now the relationist suggests that experience itself could provide reasons. But, as I will now argue, perceptual experience is ill-equipped to provide reasons. What are reasons? For present purposes,	we	do not need to take a stance on the extensive, though to my mind largely, if not entirely, verbal debates about whether reasons	are	states	of	affairs	or	mental	states	(or	propositions).	I	will	just	insist	here	that whatever	we	say,	reasons	must	be	tied	to	reasoning.	That	is,	they	must	either	themselves be	intentional	attitudes	(states	or	speech	acts)	that	figure	in	reasoning,	or	they	must	stand in	some	relation	to	such	attitudes	such	as	being	their	object.	A	state	of	affairs	such	that	it is raining could therefore not be a reason independently of any such relation to an intentional state. Now the point is that the move from experience to belief is not reasoning. Experiential states	do	not	qualify for the roles	of reasons	or reason-making	states because	they	lack	the	appropriate	propositional	and	logical	structure,	as	the	content	of experience is pre-conceptual and non-propositional and does not contain logical operators. Intuitively it also seems clear that the move from experience to belief or assertion	based	on	it	is	not	reasoning.	Typically,	I	will	just	look	at	what	is	in	front	of	me and say or think, for example, that there is a monitor in front of me. No reasoning required.	Sometimes	I	may	squint	my	eyes	and	take	a	closer	look	at	what	it	is	that	I	am dealing	with,	and	this	may	even	be	motivated	by	reasoning.	Was	this	really	a	mountain lion	that	I	saw?	Are	its	back	and	sides	tawny	to	light-cinnamon	in	color	and	its	chest	and underside	white?	Here	reasoning	directs	my	perceptual	attention,	but	that	does	not	make the move from experience to belief reasoning. Rational capacities are manifest in inferring bits	of information and	weighing them against one another in	what	Wilfred Sellars	called	the	"space	of	reasons".	Are	there	even	mountain	lions	in	Austria?	Might	one have	escaped	from	a	nearby	zoo?	But	the	move	from	experience	to	thought	is	different	in character.	We	do	not	need	a	reason	to	enter	the	space	of	reasons;	there	couldn't	even	be such a reason because to possess it we would already have to be in that space. So experience	can't	provide	reasons. The notion that experience itself already involves rational capacities, as John McDowell	(e.g.	2013)	in	particular	has	long	claimed,	so	that	by	perceiving	something	we would	already	be	in	the	space	of	reasons,	is	very	implausible.	One	has	to	be	very	much	in the	grip	of	a	philosophical	idea	to	think	that	seeing,	hearing	or	touching	something	is	an exercise	of rationality.	The idea in	question	here is the idea that	we	need	a reason to believe in the reality of the external	world, and, as	we saw, the only epistemological advantage the relationist construal of experience	might be thought to have is that it allows	us	to think	of	experience	as	providing	reasons	by	tying it to the	good	case.	But given	the	implausible	consequences	of	this	idea,	we	should	consider	alternatives. One	alternative is	provided	by	Tyler	Burge.	Burge (2003)	gives	similar	arguments against	the	idea	that	experience	provides	reasons,	but	then	goes	on	to	distinguish	two kinds	of	warrant: justification,	which involves	reasons	and is	accessible to the	subject, and	entitlement,	for	which	neither	is	true,	and	which	has	to	do	with	things	like	normal conditions and reliability. So Burge opts for epistemological externalism as against McDowell's	epistemological	internalism:	"Epistemology	must	acknowledge	elements	of warrant	that	are	not	conceptually	accessible	as	reasons	to	the	warranted	individual	if	it is	to	give	a	tenable	account	of	perceptual	belief"	(2003:	529).	But	does	the	move	from experience	to	belief	really	need	a	post	hoc	3rd	person	justification	from	epistemologists, who	do	reason	about	these	matters,	if	reasoning	about	normal	conditions,	reliability	etc. does not and could not play any role for subjects	making this	move? And given this inaccessibility, in	which sense then is entitlement really an epistemological and thus normative	status?	The	natural	view	is	that	such	a	status	would	have	to	be	in	the	space	of reasons.	Moreover,	as	Burge	points	out	himself	(2003:	537),	his	explication	of	entitlement does not address skepticism. Nor could it, since a notion of reliability under normal conditions	already	presupposes	the	reality	and	knowability	of	the	external	world.	But	then it	seems	his	explication	does	not	really	address	the	most	fundamental	aspect	of	the	move from	experience	to	belief	and	the	concerns	of	McDowell	and	others. Faced	then	with	the	equally	implausible	alternatives	of	declaring	experience	itself	and /	or	the	move	from	experience	to	belief	to	be	an	exercise	of	rationality,	or	of	dissociating epistemological	status	from	such	exercises,	I	suggest	we	try	out	a	different	perspective. 7. An	alternative	account Let us not uncritically accept the Cartesian ideas that	we can understand experience independently of any knowledge of the external world and that our response to skepticism	should	take	the	form	of	providing	a	reason	for	belief	in	that	world.	Regarding the first point, I propose to take a lesson from	developmental psychology. Let	us	use actual	development	as	an	antidote,	as	part	of	a	bit	of	Wittgensteinian	therapy,	against both traditional subjectivism and the objectivist, externalist overreaction to it. Let us accept the false belief test as a criterion for understanding mind and so let us take seriously	the	finding	that	experiencing	world	precedes	understanding	mind,	as	the	false belief test is passed around four years (classical version),	or around one year –	if	we accept the newer violation of expectation paradigms as revealing genuine belief understanding –	but in any case certainly after the infant has been perceptually experiencing	the	world.	The	rationale	for	accepting	the	false	belief	test	as	a	criterion	for understanding	mind	is	pretty	straightforward	in	the	light	of	our	earlier	reflections:	only if	a	subject	can	make	a	clear	distinction	between	how	things	are	and	how	they	seem,	that is,	between	content	and	object,	can	it	clearly	separate	mind	and	world. In this way the Cartesian question is turned on its head.	We can no longer take experience	for	granted	while	asking	whether	it	ever	gets	the	world	right,	but	instead	we have	to	ask	how	we	understand	mind	and	experience	on	the	basis	of	experiencing	world. The	role	of	reasons	is	also	turned	on	its	head.	They	do	not	lead	us	from	experience	to	the corresponding beliefs, but from beliefs to understanding experience and mind more generally. We start by perceptually experiencing objects as being related to us (and others) –	spatially and also causally (Searle 1983). We stand in intentional and experiential	relations	to	the	world	and	may	even	have	some	understanding	of	them	in our	own	case	and	that	of	others,	but	we	don't	yet	understand	that	they	obtain	in	virtue	of experiential	states	with	contents	distinct from	their	objects.	Our	understanding is	still very	primitive	–	somewhat	similar	to	the	deliberate	primitivism	of	austere	relationism	– and	at	a	level	prior	to	the	differentiation	of	mental	and	bodily	features	(Schmitz	2015). A	proper	understanding	of	experience	and	mental	states	more	broadly	begins	only when	we	start	making	assertions	and	forming	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	experience	and	learn to	resolve	interand	intraindividual	conflicts	between	attitudes	by	means	of	reasoning. In this way, we gradually come to understand misrepresentation by separating appearance and reality, content and object. For example, I come to understand that I mistook	a	lynx	for	a	mountain	lion	or	that	the	lines	in	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion	only	seem to	differ	in	length. How	to	respond	to	skepticism?	From	this	perspective,	the	possibility	and	actuality	of misrepresentation can never lead to skeptical doubt, because to ascribe a misrepresentation	we	need	a	reason	and	such	a	reason	can	only	come	from	what	(is	taken to	be)	a	good	case.	For	maximum	clarity,	let	us	spell	out	this	argument	as	a	series	of	steps: 1. To	understand	experience	we	need	to	understand	misrepresentation. 2. To	ascribe	a	misrepresentation	(bad	case)	one	needs	a	reason. 3. This	reason	can	only	come	from	(what	is	taken	to	be)	a	good	case. Conclusion:	Bad	cases	presuppose	good	cases.	Misrepresentation	can	only	be	thought of	as	a	deviation	from	the	normal	case	of	successful	representation. For	example,	I	can	only	ascribe	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion	to	myself	because	I	take	myself to	know	that	the	lines	are	actually	of	equal	length.	The	same	kind	of	argument	also	applies to	doubt.	As	Wittgenstein	pointed	out	long	ago,	doubt	also	stands	in	need	of	reasons	(ÜG: 122), and these reasons	must also come from good cases. For example, the fact that mountain	lions	are	not	native	to	Austria	gives	me	a	reason	to	doubt	that	I	have	seen	one. To	use	the	phenomenon	of	misrepresentation	to	try	to	raise	global	skeptical	doubt	is therefore to misuse it. The skeptic overlooks the fact that when I ascribed a misrepresentation	to	myself	or	doubted my	representational	success	I	presupposed	the representational	success	of	what	gave	me	reasons	for	the	ascription	or	for	doubt.	Doubt without	reasons	is	not	genuine.	Not	the	person	who	accepts	the	reality	of	the	external world	around	her is	dogmatic,	but the skeptic	who	doubts it	without reasons.	This is because believing on the basis of sense experience does not require reasons, while doubting	does. I	thus	agree	with	certain	relationists	as	well	as	with	proponents	of	the	factive	turn	in epistemology that the good cases are primary over the bad cases and that a proper account	of	perception	should	help	to	put	skepticism	to	rest.	But	on	my	view	the	skepticdefeating primacy of the	good case does not consist in that experience only provides reasons	in	the	good	case,	but	in	that	we	do	not	need	reasons	to	think	we	are	in	the	good case,	but	that	we	do	to	doubt	that	we	are,	or	to	think	that	we	are	in	the	bad	case.	That	is why	the	bad	case	can	only	be	thought	as	a	deviation from	the	primary	good	case.	The skeptical	doubt	is	misplaced	and	not	genuine	because,	first,	the	move	from	experience	to belief	is	not	an	exercise	of	rationality	and	therefore	in	the	basic	case	does	not	allow,	much less	require, justification.	And	second,	once	we	have	acquired	the	reasoning	capacities that	put	us	into	the	space	of	reasons,	these	capacities	operate	by	weighing	beliefs	against one	another	and	resolving	conflicts	between	them,	which	is	why	rejecting,	even	doubting, one	can	only	be	rational	on	the	basis	of	affirming	others.	So	global	skeptical	doubt	and the attendant demand for justification is either misguided because it is directed at something	that is	not	an	exercise	of	rationality	and	therefore	cannot	be	questioned	as such,	or	because	the	relevant	exercises	of	rationality	already	presuppose	that	we	are	in good	cases. At	an	even	more	advanced	level	of	reasoning	we	can	also	cite	the	fact	that	we	have perceived	something	as	a	special	kind	of	reason	–	one	that	specifies	the	source	of	a	belief. While such reasons involve	experience, it is still a "conceptual	mistake" (Burge	2003: 529) to think that therefore experiences themselves are reasons: not only because reasons	are	propositional	and	for	the	other	reasons	discussed	already,	but	also	because in experience itself we are not yet aware of experience. Such reasons appeal to the reliability	of	sources,	but	any	determination	of	reliability,	whether	under	normal	or	other conditions,	already	presupposes	the	existence	and	knowability	of	the	external	world	and therefore	cannot	have	a	foundational	role	in	responding	to	skeptical	doubts. We can now explain the sense in which the experiential perceptual relation is fundamental.	It	is	fundamental	in	the	sense	that	the	good	case	as	a	default	is	prior	in	the epistemological order because it does not need a reason. At the same time, the experiential	perceptual	state	is	fundamental	in	a	different	sense,	namely	ontologically	/ for purposes	of psychological explanation. It is a	more basic constituent of the	world because	it	is	present	in	the	good	as	well	as	in	the	bad	cases.	This	shows	how	the	present proposal reconciles intentionalism	and relationism,	or,	more	broadly, internalism	and externalism,	and	integrates	elements	of	both	into	the	view	that	I	above	called	"relational intentionalism".	This	view	is	intentionalist	in	so	far	as	experiential	states	with	intentional contents	are	taken	to	be	present	in	the	good	and	the	bad	cases,	and	it	is	internalist	insofar as	it	accepts	the	obvious	fact	that	these	are	states	of	organisms	located	within	them.	But it	is	also	relationist.	It	also	accepts	the	obvious	fact	that	there	are	experiential	relations to	external	objects,	and	it	holds	that	these	relations	are	epistemologically	primary	in	the sense	that	one	needs	a	reason	to	think	that	there	merely	seems	to	be	such	a	relation.	Since misrepresentation	can	thus	only	be	thought	of	as	a	deviation from	the	normal	case	of successful	representation,	and	understanding	experience	–	clearly	separating	mind	and world,	subject	and	content	–	in	turn	requires	understanding	misrepresentation,	the	view is also externalist in the sense that experience and its content cannot be understood independently	of reference to the external	world.	The	key insight	here is the	Kantian insight	that	our	understanding	of	mind	and	world	are	interdependent,	transposed	into an	unmistakably	realist	framework.	This	interdependence	is	not	to	be	confused	with	the attempt	to	invert	our	interpretation	of	a	case	where	mind	and	world	are	out	of	touch	by constructing	mind	out	of	world.	Once	we	see	that	and	leave	behind	the	excesses	of	both subjectivism	and	objectivism,	we	can	be	naive	realists	about	mind	and	world.2 References Burge, Tyler (2003): "Perceptual Entitlement" In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	67	(3),	pp.	503–548. Campbell,	John	(2002):	Reference	and	Consciousness.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Davidson, Donald (2001): Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University	Press. Dorsch, Fabian (2010): "Transparency and Imagining Seeing." In: Philosophical Explorations	13	(3),	pp.	173–200. Fish,	William	(2009):	Perception,	Hallucination,	and	Illusion.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. Hutto, Daniel and Erik Myin (2012): Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content.	Cambridge,	MA:	The	MIT	Press. 2 Thanks for their questions and comments go to audiences in Berkeley, Bochum, Vienna, Osnabrück and Kirchberg, and in particular to Mike Beaton, Peter Epstein, Christopher Gauker, Mikkel Gerken, Alex Kerr, Benjamin Kiesewetter, Sofia Miguens, Gabriele Mras, Christoph Pfisterer, Jesse Prinz, Paul Ritterbush, Tobias Schlicht, Bernhard Schmid, Eva Schmidt, Susanna Schellenberg, John Searle, Umrao Sethi, Paul Snowdon, Klaus Strelau, Charles Travis and Timothy Williamson. Thanks for helpful written comments to Federico Castellano and Ingvar Johansson. I want to especially thank the editor Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau for very helpful written comments and discussions and Xiaoxi Wu for moral support. Kripke,	Saul	(1980):	Naming	and	Necessity.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press. McDowell, John (2013): "Perceptual Experience: Both Relational and Contentful." In: European	Journal	of	Philosophy	21	(1),	pp.	144–157. Putnam, Hilary (1975): "The meaning of 'meaning.'" In: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy	of	Science,	7,	pp.	131-193. Putnam, Hilary (1981): Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schellenberg,	Susanna	(2011):	"Perceptual	Content	Defended."	In:	Noûs	45	(4),	pp.	714– 750. Schmitz, Michael (2015): "Joint Attention and Understanding Others." In: Synthesis Philosophica	58,	pp.	235–251. Searle, John R. (1983): Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of	Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press. Searle,	John	R.	(1992):	The	Rediscovery	of	the	Mind.	Cambridge,	MA:	The	MIT	Press. Travis,	Charles	(2004):	"The	Silence	of	the	Senses."	In:	Mind	113	(449),	pp.	57–94. Wittgenstein,	Ludwig	(1958):	Philosophical	Investigations.	Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell. Wittgenstein,	Ludwig	(1984):	Philosophische	Untersuchungen.	Frankfurt:	Suhrkamp. Wittgenstein,	Ludwig	(1984):	Über	Gewissheit.	Frankfurt:	Suhrkamp.